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CASE NOTE: VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY V WILSON & 
ORS 
The Supreme Court of Victoria Tries Some Socio-legal Analysis in 
Reconceptualising the Role of Academics 
By Gavin Moodie∗ 
In a recent decision, Victoria University of Technology v Wilson & 
Ors, the Supreme Court of Victoria, Australia decided against two 
academic defendants in a case brought by their university 
employer over the ownership of intellectual property. The case 
turned on whether the academics invented the property within the 
scope of their employment, and is interesting due to the court’s 
finding that the comparatively recent commercialisation of 
Australian universities had reconstructed the nature of academic 
work. The court held that a full professor and a senior lecturer — 
a middle-level academic grade in Australian universities — had a 
fiduciary duty to account to their employer university for gains 
from business opportunities they learnt of in the course of their 
employment. 
Introduction 
Nettle J, sitting alone in the Supreme Court of Victoria, took account of recent 
trends in society to reconceptualise the role of academics in Victoria 
University of Technology v Wilson & Ors.1 Nettle J determined what was 
invented ‘within the scope of employment’, and therefore owned by the 
university according to general principles which, His Honour found, left 
considerable discretion to the senior academic defendant, Professor Ken 
Wilson. A concomitant of that discretion was a fiduciary duty which His 
Honour found Professor Wilson and his colleague Dr Feaver breached. 
Interestingly, Nettle J defined academics’ scope of employment not by the 
activities of their university as a whole, but by the activities of the unit in 
which they worked. This leaves open the possibility of segmenting and 
defining academics’ scope of employment differently for teaching, research 
and service by the centre, school or department in which they conduct each 
part of their work. 
                                                          
∗ School of Law and Principal Policy Adviser, Griffith University. I thank Peter 
Collinson, Andrew Panna and Helen Rofe of counsel for their comments on an 
earlier draft of this note. 
1 Victoria University of Technology v Wilson & Ors [2004] VSC 33. 
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Facts 
In July 1999, World Trade Online Holdings Limited (WTO) contacted the first 
defendant, Professor Ken Wilson, then head of the School of Applied 
Economics at Victoria University of Technology (VUT) about the possibility 
of the university developing a range of online international business and trade 
subjects to support an online international trading exchange WTO was 
planning to develop. 
In early September 1999, WTO asked Wilson and the second defendant, 
Dr Donald Feaver, a senior lecturer in VUT’s school of applied economics, to 
develop a system design for the online international trading exchange that 
WTO wished to develop. The sixth defendant, Craig Astill, started working on 
the project at about this time as an investor in WTO. Software system design 
was outside the then expertise and work normally done by Wilson and Feaver, 
but they nevertheless agreed and were able to complete the project. On 23 
September 1999 Wilson, Feaver and Astill signed a statement that all 
intellectual property in the software system design for WTO was owned by the 
three men and on 6 December 1999 they established IP3 Systems Pty Ltd as a 
corporate vehicle for developing and exploiting the invention. However, for 
some time afterwards, Wilson and Feaver continued to refer to their formal 
positions at VUT in business presentations of the system. 
WTO dropped out of the project by the end of November 1999 and on 
16 March 2000 Wilson, Feaver and Astill lodged an Australian provisional 
patent application for their software system design in the name of IP3 Systems. 
On 16 March 2001 a complete patent specification was filed for the invention, 
this time in the names of Wilson, Feaver and Astill who assigned their rights in 
the patent application to IP3 Systems. 
In August 2002 another VUT academic, Dr Morris, ‘came upon the IP3 
Systems website and after reading what it said about Professor Wilson and Dr 
Feaver, he broadcast on the university’s intranet an email in which he posed 
the question of how Professor Wilson and Dr Feaver could have found time to 
be involved consistently with their duties to the university’, as Nettle J 
recounted in paragraph 69 of his judgment. This led to the university 
investigating the matter and beginning the proceeding against Wilson, Feaver, 
Astill and their company, IP3 Systems, and their associates 10 months later, on 
4 June 2003. 
Within the Scope of Employment 
VUT’s intellectual property policy extant at the time the facts in the case took 
place sought to vest in the university ownership of any invention that involved 
the use of the university’s materials.2 The deputy vice-chancellor (DVC) then 
responsible for VUT’s intellectual property policy had finalised the policy on 
30 June 1995, but Nettle J found that there was no evidence that the policy had 
been adopted by the university’s governing body and he found further that it 
had not been published in the university’s staff manual (paragraph 82). There 
wasn’t even evidence that the policy had been formally adopted by the vice-
                                                          
2 Helen Rofe of counsel, personal communication, 11 May 2004. 
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chancellor (para 85). Since the invention was not covered by an intellectual 
property policy then in force, His Honour therefore had to decide the 
ownership of the invention on general principles. 
It is long settled that an implied term of employment is that any invention 
or discovery made by an employee in the course of work which they were 
retained to perform is the property of the employer and not of the employee: 
Triplex Safety Glass Co v Scorah.3 A critical question for the court was 
therefore whether the invention of the online international trading exchange 
was within Wilson and Feaver’s scope of employment. Nettle J defined their 
scope of employment not by the activities of the university as a whole, but by 
the activities of the School of Applied Economics in which Wilson and Feaver 
were retained to conduct their research (para 108). His Honour found that the 
invention was not within the scope of Wilson and Feaver’s employment after 
they signed their statement on 23 September 1999, for two reasons.  
First, His Honour found that the school’s research was confined to 
academic research which resulted in scholarly papers which did not extend to 
‘the sorts of practical or applied research that are relevant to the development 
and implementation of a computer based e-commerce system’ (para 111). 
Nettle J held that the fact that other parts of the university may have engaged 
in that type of research was not relevant to determining the sorts of research 
that Wilson and Feaver were retained to conduct. 
Second, the court noted that Wilson and Feaver’s duties were expansively 
defined, that there appeared ‘to have been a degree of flexibility in what might 
be done by way of work in the school’ (para 122) and that Wilson had 
considerable discretion in determining what work would be within the scope of 
his and his staff’s employment. Conversely, Wilson could exercise the same 
discretion to determine what would be outside university work and done in a 
private capacity, as he had sought to do in the statement he signed with his co-
inventors on 23 September 1999. His Honour reasoned thus (at para 139): 
It remains however to consider the effect the agreement made between 
Professor Wilson and Dr Feaver and Mr Astill on 23 September 1999 
that thenceforth the three of them would own the intellectual property in 
the design they were about to produce. The answer would seem to be 
simple. Paradoxical it may be, but logic dictates that inasmuch as 
Professor Wilson may have had authority to decide that work on the 
system design should be undertaken as a university project, he also had 
authority to decide that it would cease to be a university project. As I 
see it, the effect of the agreement was that the three men ceased at that 
point to work on the project on behalf of the university and that the 
work which they carried out on the project after that point was done on 
their own account. 
However, Nettle J found that WTO had approached Wilson to undertake 
the project in his capacity as an employee of the university, and since Wilson 
had exercised his power to determine that he and Feaver should work upon the 
                                                          
3 Triplex Safety Glass Co v Scorah [1937] 1 Ch 211. 
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system design as a university project at least until the statement was signed on 
23 September 1999, the invention was within the scope of their employment 
until that time (para 119). His Honour found that the invention had been made 
in the evenings and on weekends but that the inventors had also used some 
university time and resources in developing the system. But this was not so 
important to the court in determining that the work was a university project as 
the inventors’ use of university letterhead, logos and titles in presenting the 
work. 
On this point, the case should be distinguished from Nottingham 
University v Fishel.4 Dr Fishel was a clinical embryologist employed by 
Nottingham University to conduct research but also to undertake in-vitro 
fertilisation (IVF) procedures at the university’s facilities. Fishel also 
conducted IVF procedures for other institutions at their facilities. While Fishel 
received approaches to undertake outside consultancies at his employer’s 
premises and used his employer’s facilities to arrange the consultancies, the 
court held that Fishel attracted the consultancies largely on the strength of his 
personal reputation rather than because of his university position. The 
consultancies were therefore not university work. (The case was nevertheless 
decided against Fishel because the court held that his consultancies were 
covered by the university’s outside work policy which Fishel had breached.)  
Employee’s Duty 
Having found that the project was a university project at least until the date of 
the statement on 23 September 1999, the court next had to consider an 
employee’s duty in handling business opportunities they receive as employees. 
Employees first have a contractual duty of fidelity and loyalty to their 
employer, and this duty is different for different types of employee: Hivac Ltd 
v Park Royal Scientific Instruments Ltd.5 An employee employed at a lower 
level of skill, responsibility and remuneration has a lesser duty than an 
employee with greater responsibility and remuneration. 
Employees may also have a fiduciary duty to their employer. Nettle J held 
that an employee’s fiduciary duties also depend on the ‘nature and terms of 
employment’ (para 145). His Honour found (paras 147, 148, 149) that 
academics’ duties have been changed by recent social developments: 
(147) Perhaps it is not all that long ago that professional public servants 
(in the broad sense that includes academics) were expected to refrain 
from private money making activities. The theory then was that such 
persons were appointed to do a job which was expected to be all-
consuming, and they were paid a salary, in effect, for the whole of their 
time. If such an employee were not working he was expected to be at 
rest, and it was a misuse of his resting time (for which, in effect, the 
employer was paying) to work for someone else. It went without saying 
that they would not work for themselves or for anyone else. 
                                                          
4 Nottingham University v Fishel (QBD) [2000] ICR 1462. 
5 Hivac Ltd v Park Royal Scientific Instruments Ltd [1946] 1 Ch 169. 
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(148) But that is no longer the case. In the last thirty years, public 
service in general and academia in particular have changed 
considerably. To a greater or lesser extent, both have been politicised 
and commercialised. The notions which once informed the Northcote–
Trevelyan reforms of the civil service have been put aside. A number of 
the conditions of service which once informed academic service 
structures have been replaced with ‘business practices’. Permanent and 
tenured employees have in many cases been replaced with ‘contractors’. 
And correspondingly, notions of loyalty and service have tended to 
diminish. It no longer goes without saying that public servants in 
general or academics in particular are bound to refrain from extraneous 
paid activities. These days it takes an express term of contract or 
condition of service in order to achieve that result. Accordingly, I do 
not accept that it is enough to make an academic liable to account for 
information or opportunity acquired while working that the academic 
may spend most of his time working.6 Furthermore, in the case of 
Professor Wilson and Dr Feaver, the terms of the university’s outside 
work policy provided that they were free to work outside university 
hours without consent, provided the work involved did not interfere 
with their duties to the university. 
(149) On the other hand, and subject to contract, it remains 
unquestionable that professional employees owe to their employers 
fiduciary obligations not to profit from their position at the expense of 
the employer and to avoid conflicts of interest and duty.7 Accordingly, 
even if an employee is, generally speaking, free to work for someone 
else, he or she must avoid work which could conflict with the interests 
of the employer that the employee is paid to serve.8 Correspondingly, in 
the absence of full and frank disclosure and consent, a professional 
employee remains bound to account to the employer for gains derived 
as a result of the employee’s fiduciary position and for opportunities of 
which the employee may learn in the course of employment; lest the 
employee otherwise be swayed by considerations of personal interest. 
Nothing which has occurred in the last thirty years has altered any of 
that. 
His Honour found that Wilson and Feaver were presented with the 
opportunity to design the online international trading system as employees of 
VUT, and that they did not disclose the opportunity to their employer. 
Furthermore, Wilson and Feaver ‘began work on the system design in their 
capacities as employees of the university and for the benefit of the university 
and that they continued in that vein until 23 September 1999’ (para 150). 
However, ‘the effect of the decision of 23 September 1999 was to take away 
                                                          
6 Nottingham University v Fishel, QBD) [2000] ICR 1462 at 1494. 
7 New Zealand Netherlands Society ‘Orange’ Incorporated v Kuys [1973] 1 WLR 
1126 at 1129; Consul Developments Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd (1975) 132 
CLR 373 at 377. 
8 Warman International Ltd v Dwyer (1995) 182 CLR 544 at 557–58. 
230 GRIFFITH LAW REVIEW (2004) VOL 13 NO 2 
from the university and transfer to the three individuals the opportunity of 
continuing with the design of the system, in order thereby to exploit the 
opportunity for their own benefit to the exclusion of the university’. His 
Honour therefore concluded that Wilson and Feaver breached their fiduciary 
obligations to their employer (para 150).   
As Helen Rofe of counsel observed,9 it is interesting that his Honour 
attributed the same level of fiduciary duty to Professor Wilson, the head of the 
School of Applied Economics, and to Dr Feaver, a senior lecturer. In Ms 
Rofe’s view, His Honour attributed a relatively high fiduciary duty to ‘a not 
very senior academic’. If the correct inference is that the ‘nature and terms of 
employment’ of a senior lecturer are sufficiently similar to those of a professor 
and head of department to attract the same fiduciary duty, arguably a similar 
duty is also owed by a tenured lecturer at level B. 
Remedies 
Wilson and Feaver started working on the invention in September 1999 and, 
had VUT applied for a constructive trust over the intellectual property before 
the end of that year, it may have been successful. However, by the time the 
university issued proceedings on 4 June 2003, other people had contributed to 
the creation of the intellectual property and had invested substantial capital in 
developing the property. Nettle J therefore declined to grant VUT’s application 
for a constructive trust over the property, and instead granted the university a 
constructive trust over the shares in the property owned by their employees, 
Wilson and Feaver. This demonstrates how the relief in equity is moulded to 
reflect the state of events at the time of the trial10 and not, for example, at the 
time of the breach of fiduciary duty. 
VUT became aware that Wilson and Feaver had founded IP3 Systems to 
develop intellectual property which was protected by an international patent at 
least by August 2002. However, it did not institute proceedings until 4 June 
2003. Nonetheless, the university was able to obtain ex parte an Anton Piller 
order against the defendants to allow the university to enter the defendants’ 
premises to look for, inspect and take away any infringing items and 
documents relating to the defendants’ infringing acts. Anton Piller orders are 
to protect plaintiffs against a substantial risk that a defendant may dispose of 
infringing items and documents relating to its infringing activities. The 
defendants must have expected that legal proceedings were a possibility at 
least since the university began its internal investigation from around late 
2002. The fact that the court was willing to grant Anton Piller orders ex parte 
six months later suggests that Australian courts may be more liberal in 
granting these orders than envisaged by Lord Denning MR in Anton Piller KG 
v Manufacturing Processes Ltd.11 
                                                          
9 Personal communication, 11 May 2004. 
10 I am grateful to Peter Collinson of counsel for this observation, personal 
communication 6 May 2004. 
11 Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1976] 1 All ER 779 (CA). 
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Discussion 
Many Australian universities’ intellectual property policies, including VUT’s 
subsequent intellectual property policy which was validly adopted but which 
did not apply to these proceedings, restate the common law in vesting in the 
university inventions made by staff ‘within the scope of employment’. 
Accordingly, the court’s reasoning on what falls within the scope of 
employment is relevant to many universities’ intellectual property policies as 
well as elucidating the position at common law.12 Furthermore, it seems that 
Nettle J would be willing to determine the scope of employment for some of 
an academic’s duties, such as research, by reference to a research centre in 
which the academic conducted their research, for example, but determine the 
scope of their employment in teaching by reference to the school or 
department in which they did their teaching. The issue may be further 
complicated for the significant minority of staff who research and teach in 
more than one centre, school or department.  
The case is also interesting in showing how the court understood that the 
comparatively recent commercialisation of Australian universities had 
reconstructed the nature of academic work. On the other hand, Nettle J found 
that academics, at least at the level of head of school and probably also 
professors who are not heads of school, have considerable discretion in 
determining the scope of their academic employment. Whatever commentators 
say about the increasing managerialism of universities, Nettle J did not find 
that it had advanced sufficiently at VUT to limit Professor Wilson’s discretion 
in determining what would and would not be undertaken as a university 
project. In this, I suspect VUT is not materially different from most other 
Australian universities. The rational response of universities would be to 
become even more managerialist, or at least to ensure that their senior staff 
discuss and report their work to their supervisor more fully than ‘the sketchiest 
details’ that the court found Wilson had given to his supervisor, the dean of 
business and law (para 175). Had the university been aware of the activities of 
its staff earlier, it would have been in a better position to obtain the remedy it 
sought, and it may even have been able to avoid the matter being litigated.  
The court held a senior lecturer to the same fiduciary duty as a professor 
and head of department, and arguably a similar high duty applies to a tenured 
lecturer at level B. In the view of Andrew Panna13 of counsel, the extensive 
reach of equity and fiduciary duties is not well understood. It may also not be 
well accepted by academic staff who have a proprietorial view of ‘their’ ideas, 
‘their’ research’ and ‘their’ teaching. This suggests that universities have a 
major and difficult task in developing a shared understanding of the ownership 
and management of their intellectual property while maintaining academics’ 
pride in and commitment to their intellectual achievements.  
                                                          
12 I am grateful to Helen Rofe of counsel for this observation, personal 
communication 11 May 2004. 
13 Personal communication, 6 May 2004. 
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Finally, it is unfortunate that a university should ever sue their current 
staff. Nettle J found a ‘remarkable … level of distrust and animosity exhibited 
throughout the trial’ (para 218). As the parties with overwhelmingly greater 
resources and broader long-term interests, universities should take more 
responsibility for settling disagreements with their staff in preference to 
enforcing strictly their legal rights, however correct in law they may be.  
Professor Wilson, Dr Feaver and their associated companies have 
appealed to the Court of Appeal on the issue of liability. 
